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Commissions appointed to examine and propose solutions to major policy problems 
play a vital role in policy formulation in the Nordic countries. Whereas existing accounts 
emphasize the corporatist and statist features of these bodies, this article investigates 
the changing role of academic knowledge within commissions. It does so through an 
empirical and normative analysis of Norwegian ad hoc advisory commissions appointed 
during the period 1967-2013. Based on a quantitative analysis of commission 
composition and citation practices, the article finds a growing reliance on academics and 
academic knowledge in commission work. Moreover, drawing on different reasonable 
conceptions of democratic legitimacy, the article argues that this trend is problematic 
mostly from approaches that regard democracy as aggregative, participatory, and 
intrinsically justified. From the perspectives of deliberative, elite, and epistemically 





Commissions appointed to examine major policy issues and provide advice about 
solutions are an important element of policy-making in many political systems. In the 
Nordic countries, ad hoc advisory commissions have played a particularly vital role in 
the formulation of public policy, to the point that they have been described as a core 
element of the consensual Nordic model of government (Heclo 1974; Arter 2008; 
Campbell and Pedersen 2014). Traditionally, these commissions have been studied 
mainly from two perspectives: a corporatist perspective that sees commissions as 
institutions for integrating interest groups in the decision-making process (Christiansen 
et al. 2010) and a state-centered perspective that emphasizes the role of the state in the 
organization and operation of commissions (Meijer 1969; Lindvall and Rothstein 2006). 
However, broader societal and political changes over the last decades have put the 
conventional understanding of commissions under pressure. Scholars have pointed both 
to a drop in interest representation on commissions as one element of the decline of 
corporatism (Öberg et al. 2011) and to the politicization of the commission system 
(Christensen et al. 2009).  
A development that has received less attention is the changing role of knowledge 
within these commissions. Several observers argue that contemporary politics and 
policy-making has become increasingly reliant on scientific knowledge (Turner 2003; 
Kitcher 2011). The expanding role of expert bodies such as courts, agencies and central 
banks (Vibert 2007; Olsen 2010), the rise of powerful global professions (Slaughter 
2004; Fourcade 2006), calls for evidence-based policy-making (Nutley et al. 2000; 
Cairney 2016), and the increasing need to back up political proposals with references to 
research (Weingart 1999; Boswell 2008; Fischer 2009) can all be seen as expressions of 
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this trend. We suspect that the growing reliance on academic knowledge also has 
affected the Nordic commission systems. Some recent analyses show that academics 
make up a substantial proportion of commission members both in Denmark and Norway 
(Christensen et al. 2009; Tellmann 2016), and another study argues that there has been 
a shift from tripartite to expert commissions in Denmark (Campbell and Pedersen 
2014). Yet, these studies have not theorized or systematically analyzed the changing role 
of academic knowledge within advisory commissions over time. Nor have they 
addressed the normative implications of these changes: Have academics crowded out 
legitimate political interests from the policy-making process, or should we rather 
welcome the “scientization” (Habermas 1963/1971) of advisory commissions as an 
expression of a new and promising way of doing research-based policy-making? Is an 
increasing reliance on academic knowledge eroding democratic legitimacy, or is it an 
asset for good democratic governance? 
In this article, we address both empirical and normative questions about the 
changing role of academic knowledge on ad hoc advisory commissions through an 
analysis of Norwegian Official Commissions (Norges offentlige utredninger – NOU) 
appointed during the period 1967-2013. These are commissions appointed by 
government to look into a specific policy problem and propose appropriate solutions 
based on a thorough examination of the issue. Commissions usually work for a year or 
longer, synthesizing existing knowledge and sometimes also commissioning or carrying 
out new research. Their advice mainly feeds into the policy formulation stage of the 
decision-making process, that is, before concrete policies are proposed by the 
government. Commissions are composed of members from the civil service, political 
parties, interest groups, academia or the private sector, and are led by a chairman and 
supported by a secretariat. 
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Empirically, we trace the changing reliance on academic knowledge on 
commissions along two dimensions. The first is the participation of academics on 
commissions, that is, to what extent commission chairmen, members and secretaries are 
drawn from academia rather than from the civil service, political parties or interest 
groups. Although the relationship between the participation of academics and the actual 
use of academic knowledge is surely not one-to-one, the involvement of academics in 
commission deliberations is conducive to a greater emphasis on academic knowledge in 
defining policy problems and solutions. The second dimension is the use of citations to 
academic literature in commission reports, that is, to what extent reports make explicit 
reference to different types of academic publications. The use of citations provides an 
indication of the extent to which the arguments made by a commission are rooted in 
academic knowledge, although it must be interpreted with care (see further discussion 
in the research design section). Normatively, we evaluate the developments in the 
reliance on academic knowledge in light of different reasonable conceptions of 
democratic legitimacy, which we elaborate on in the article. 
The research questions we pose are: (1) How did the participation of academics 
and the use of citations to academic knowledge within Norwegian ad hoc advisory 
commissions change during the period 1967-2013? (2) How did these changes affect 
democratic legitimacy? The analysis includes all policy-preparing commissions 
appointed during this period in a key area of government activity, namely economic 
policy. This policy area is chosen based on its substantive importance: economic policies 
not only have a profound impact on socio-economic outcomes; they also influence the 
scope for other types of government policy. As we argue later in the article, this is also a 
policy area where academic concerns compete with strong political, bureaucratic and 
societal interests.  
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The objective of this article is thus twofold. First, we seek to contribute to the 
literature on advisory commissions as key institutions in policy-making in the Nordic 
countries, by developing a knowledge-centered perspective as an alternative to 
conventional corporatist and state-centered accounts and by examining empirically the 
changing reliance on academic knowledge within commissions. Second, we aim to 
contribute innovatively to normative discussions about the place of scientific knowledge 
in contemporary policy-making, both by combining empirical and evaluative analysis 
and by replacing general statements about implications for “democracy” with a more 
fine-grained discussion that takes into account different reasonable ideas of what 
democratic legitimacy implies (Rawls 1993: 131-172, Peter 2011). 
The article is structured as follows. We first review existing literature about 
Nordic advisory commissions. We then discuss the increased use of academic knowledge 
in policy-making and what this implies from the perspective of different reasonable 
accounts of democratic legitimacy. After describing the design of our analysis, we 
present empirical evidence on the changing role of academic knowledge on Norwegian 
commissions and subsequently discuss these developments in light of democratic 
requirements. We conclude by discussing the implications and limits of the analysis. 
 
Theoretical discussion 
Conventional Perspectives on Nordic Commissions 
When making political decisions, governments may seek informed policy advice through 
a number of channels, including the permanent bureaucracy, political advisers, interest 
group lobbying, think tanks, consultancy reports, government-funded research, and 
permanent and temporary advisory bodies. The specific configuration of policy advice 
varies considerably across countries, leading scholars to speak of different ‘policy 
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advisory systems’ (Craft & Howlett 2013) or ‘knowledge regimes’ (Campbell & Pedersen 
2014). For instance, Campbell and Pedersen argue that whereas the U.S. knowledge 
regime in economic policy is characterized by competition among a multitude of private 
knowledge providers, the continental European countries rely more on policy 
knowledge from public and semi-public research organizations and standing advisory 
bodies.  
Although Nordic governments draw on policy advice from numerous sources, 
temporary advisory commissions have traditionally been seen as an especially 
important channel for advice (Meijer 1969; Anton 1969; Christensen et al. 2009; 
Petersson 2015). The function of these commissions is to examine specific policy 
problems and recommend solutions, for instance about how the pension system should 
be reformed to meet the challenges of an ageing population. Significantly, commissions 
usually contribute advice in the early stages of the policy-making process, that is, before 
the government puts concrete policy proposals on the table. This differs from advisory 
bodies whose role it is to assess already formulated government proposals, such as 
advisory councils in Belgium (Fobé et al. 2013). The central and routinized role played 
by commissions in the formulation of public policy in the Nordic countries has led 
scholars to characterize them as a core element of the ‘Nordic model of government’ 
(Arter 2008). 
Traditionally, these commissions have been studied from two main perspectives. 
First, commissions have been seen as “the foremost institutional expression” of 
corporatism, that is, the institutionalized participation of interest groups in policy-
making (Christiansen et al. 2010:29; Rommetvedt et al. 2012). From a corporatist 
perspective, commissions are arenas for resource exchange between government and 
organized interests: interest groups are given access to the policy formulation process in 
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exchange for providing government with policy-relevant information and political 
support. The consultation of interest groups is a routine step in the preparation of new 
policies. This perspective was dominant in the literature from the 1970s and 80s about 
the sprawling network of commissions and advisory bodies in Scandinavia (Moren 
1974; Kvavik 1976; Buksti & Johansen 1979; Egeberg 1981). Key expressions of the 
corporatist nature of the Nordic commission systems were the great number of 
commissions with interest group representation and the prevalence of bargaining and 
compromising within these bodies. 
Second, commissions have been studied from a state-centered perspective 
emphasizing the control of the bureaucracy over the organization and operation of 
commissions (Meijer 1969; Nordby 1999; Lindvall and Rothstein 2006). From this 
perspective, advisory commissions have been seen essentially as an extension of public 
administration. This view has been closely linked to the notion of the Nordic countries 
as ‘strong states’ with long traditions of professional civil servants making and 
administering policies – often with the help of commissions (Heclo 1974). Significantly, 
the state controls the organization of commissions in the Nordic countries: not only does 
the government appoint commissions; it also formulates their terms of reference, picks 
their chairman and decides on their composition (Meijer 1969, 105; Nordby 1999). State 
control is further enhanced by the participation of civil servants as commission 
chairmen, members and secretaries. In fact, the extensive involvement of government 
officials has been argued to distinguish Nordic commissions from the more independent 
commissions in countries like the U.K. (Heclo 1974, 43-46). 
However, societal and political changes from about 1980 onwards challenged 
these traditional images of commissions. Most importantly, the decline of corporatism in 
the Nordic political systems implied that the institutionalized participation of interest 
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groups in policy preparation and implementation was scaled back (Öberg et al. 2011). 
One expression of this was a dramatic reduction in the number of advisory commissions 
and other bodies where interest groups were represented, at least in Norway and 
Denmark (Nordby 1994; Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003; Christiansen et al. 2010; see 
Hermansson et al. 1997 for a discussion of the Swedish case). Some observers also point 
to an increasing politicization of the commission institution in this period. A major 
Danish study argues that the appointment of advisory commissions has gone from being 
an ‘institutional norm’ to becoming a ‘strategic choice’, with commissions now only 
being used “when a government finds it strategically convenient” (Christensen et al. 
2009, 21). Yet, these diagnoses provide an incomplete picture of the transformation of 
advisory commissions. A development that has received little attention in the existing 
literature is the changing role of knowledge within these commissions (with some 
recent exceptions, such as Innvær 2009, which we discuss below). In the following, we 
address this gap by discussing the growing reliance on academic knowledge in policy-
making and developing a knowledge-centered perspective on advisory commissions. 
 
The Growing Reliance on Academic Knowledge in Policy-Making 
There are conflicting accounts of how the role of academic knowledge in policy-making 
has changed over recent decades. According to one account, knowledge production is 
becoming more “socially distributed” (Gibbons et al. 1994) and “democratization of 
expertise” more widespread (see Maasen and Weingart 2006 for different assessments), 
replacing the previous dominance of academic expertise with more “pluralist” and 
“hybrid” forms (Krick 2015, see also Grundmann 2016 on the pitfall of generally 
equating ‘experts’ with ‘scientists’). Yet, according to another account, contemporary 
governance relies extensively and perhaps even increasingly on academic expertise 
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(Turner 2003; Douglas 2009; Kitcher 2011). One sign of such a development is what 
Frank Vibert (2007) refers to as “the rise of the unelected”: the expanding role of courts, 
agencies, central banks and other expert bodies inhabited by academics with 
substantive discretionary powers (see also Olsen 2010). Another is the ascent of 
academics to high political and bureaucratic offices. Consider for instance the 
appointment of academic economists as ministers or top civil servants in a number of 
Latin American and Eastern European countries in the 1990s (Markoff and Montecinos 
1993; Fourcade 2006). A further expression is the increased significance of epistemic 
logics in parliamentary processes and in the public sphere, as civil society organizations 
and political parties increasingly feel the need to support their proposals with 
references to academic research (Fischer 2009). These developments form the backdrop 
for diagnoses of a rising “expertocracy” (Habermas 1996) or “epistocracy of the 
educated” (Estlund 2008; see also Brennan 2016) – a rule of scientists and professionals 
– empirically often intertwined with, but analytically distinguishable from, alternative 
notions of “technocracy” centered on strong bureaucracy and executive dominance (‘a 
rule of bureaucrats’), corporatist elite bargaining, and/or government by “business 
people” (cf. “stealth democracy”, see Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 2002).  
On a general level, a main explanation of the growing reliance on academic 
knowledge is the technological and regulatory complexity and level of specialization of 
modern society. This complexity makes governments functionally dependent on 
scientific expertise: without academics and professionals, these societies would not 
work (Majone 1996; Kitcher 2011). In addition comes the widespread belief in 
the ”problem-solving” function of science and research, that is, that a consistent 
utilization of scientific expertise and evidence will help solve policy problems and 
ensure social progress (see Weiss 1986 and Boswell 2008 for critical discussions). This 
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understanding of the relationship between research and policy-making has also been 
key to the movement for “evidence-based policy-making” (EBPM), centered on the idea 
that public policy should be based on scientific evidence established through rigorous 
testing (e.g. Nutley et al. 2000; see also Cairney 2016 for a recent overview), even if the 
outcomes and assessments of EBPM-induced reforms so far are mixed (e.g. Hammersley 
2005; Smith 2013; Oliver et al. 2014). Moreover, the use of academic knowledge may be 
promoted by powerful social groups and actors, who are animated by a sincere 
commitment to research-based policy-making or by the strategic or tactical benefits of 
using knowledge. It is well known how politicians and officials use expertise selectively 
to consolidate organizational preferences or legitimize predetermined policy decisions, 
or symbolically to demonstrate competence and “epistemic authority” (cf.  Hunter & 
Boswell 2015). 
Arguments about the significant and, by many accounts, growing reliance on 
academic knowledge in policy-making can form the basis of a third perspective on 
Nordic advisory commissions (see also Johansson 1992; Tellmann 2016). From this 
knowledge-centered perspective, advisory commissions can be regarded primarily as 
institutions for the utilization of academic knowledge in policy-making. Located at the 
intersection of science and politics, commissions serve as mechanisms for incorporating 
academic insights into the formulation of policy. Commissions collect and analyze facts 
about societal problems and utilize knowledge to address these problems. Academics 
are key participants in this work, bringing special theoretical knowledge and state-of-
the-art research to the table. This particular expertise of academics gives them authority 
in defining policy problems and solutions, and discussions within commissions are 
guided by arguments based on research and evidence rather than on political ideology 
or interests.  
12 
 
  While existing research on the use of academic knowledge in Nordic advisory 
commissions is limited, some recent studies suggest a growing involvement of scientific 
experts in commission work. Data on Danish commissions indicate a steep increase in 
the participation of academics since 1980 (although this trend is given little weight by 
the authors) (Christensen et al. 2009). Another study of the Danish economic knowledge 
regime argues that a shift from tripartite to expert commissions has taken place since 
the 1980s, with policy-makers relying more on input from experts than from the 
traditional social partners (Campbell and Pedersen 2014: 203). Moreover, a recent 
investigation of the Norwegian commission system highlights the role of expertise and 
presents evidence that academic experts in recent years have been important actors 
within these commissions (Tellmann 2016). On the other hand, a study of Norwegian 
commission reports in health policy finds the use of scientific evidence in these 
documents to be of low quality (Innvær 2009). However, these studies have not 
systematically analyzed the changing role of academic knowledge within advisory 
commissions over time. Nor have they evaluated what these changes imply for 
democratic legitimacy. In the next sub-section, we introduce three dimensions that are 
central for evaluating democratic credentials. 
 
Experts in Policy-Making and Democratic Legitimacy 
Existing diagnoses of ”epistocracy” tend to present it as a tragedy for democracy, leaving 
us in effect with “façade democracy” (Streeck 2014), “disfigured democracy” (Urbinati 
2014), or “post-democracy” (Habermas 2015). On the other extreme are scholars who 
welcome an increasing role of scientists and academics as a way of overcoming the 
ignorance of the citizenry and as a precondition for rational and  knowledge-based 
policy-making (Pincione and Tesón 2006; Caplan 2007; Brennan 2016).  
13 
 
It is often noted how grand diagnoses lack a clear empirical basis, but their 
normative basis is arguably no less problematic. The trouble is sometimes vagueness in 
definitions of decisive parameters, such as “democracy” or “knowledge-based”. Yet, for 
our purposes, the most serious shortcoming is how contributors – often quite 
consciously of course1 – disregard the fact of reasonable disagreement. 
“Reasonableness” is a key term in John Rawls’ normative theory of political legitimacy. 
Due to what Rawls refers to as the “burdens of judgment”, or sources of disagreement 
inherent in the use of human reason (Rawls 1993: 54),2 even reasonable persons – 
persons motivated by good reasons alone – will disagree on how to understand and rank 
values. Given this condition, a certain “overlapping consensus” of basic principles of 
justice is within reach: a consensus that reasonable citizens can affirm from within 
his/her own perspective (Rawls 1993, 131-172). However, in a range of discussions that 
concern morality, law and policy, citizens will end up disagreeing, not necessarily 
because they are biased or mistaken, but for good reasons.  
Accordingly, in the following, where we cannot take upon us the demanding task 
of proposing a notion of a democracy that we could expect people to come to an 
“overlapping” agreement on, we will assess our findings from the point of view of 
“democracy” approached as a bundle of different reasonable conceptions of democratic 
legitimacy (see also Peter 2011).  
More specifically, we will rely on the in normative political theory well-
established distinctions between elite and participatory, aggregative and deliberative, 
                                                          
1 Philosophers such as Urbinati and Brennan do not aim at delineating the scope of reasonable discussion, 
but at defending what they ultimately see as the most correct position.  
2 Rawls lists six sources of reasonable disagreement: 1) Relevant facts in a case can be difficult to assess 
because they point in different directions. 2) Relevant considerations can be given different weight. 3) To 
a certain degree our concepts are indeterminate and vulnerable to hard cases. 4) Life experiences shape 
how we select facts and how we weigh moral and political values. 5) Most often there are normative 
considerations with different force on all sides of a case and an overall assessment of these considerations 
can be difficult. 6) Since not all possible positive values can be realized simultaneously, one must range 
values, and for such rankings we mostly lack clear and uncontroversial criteria. 
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and intrinsically and epistemically justified democracy (“epistemic democracy”), and 
evaluate how our findings affect democratic legitimacy depending on the different 
conceptions of democracy that feed into these three distinctions. The elite/participatory 
distinction refers to the degree of inclusion in political processes. For participatory 
democrats, legitimacy depends on citizens’ broad participation and deep involvement in 
the full policy-cycle (Pateman 1970, 2012). Elite democrats regard viable democratic 
governance as reliant on the responsible political leadership of societal elites, and the 
citizens’ primary role in a democracy as ensuring the smooth and peaceful circulation of 
elites (a classical statement is Schumpeter (1942); a recent account is Achen and Bartels 
2016). The aggregative/deliberative distinction refers to the underlying principle of 
collective decision-making. Aggregative democrats consider democracy as a way of 
aggregating individual preferences to collective choices (the notion is intimately 
connected to Arrow 1951/2012; Przeworski 2010 is a recent example). The central 
procedure is voting, based on the principle “one person, one vote”, where each vote is to 
be given equal consideration. In contrast, deliberative democracy stresses “the 
importance of public discussions prior to a vote” (Peter, 2011: 31). Citizens’ political will 
are not considered synonymous with their revealed preferences, but as the transformed 
outcomes of processes of argumentation and intersubjective scrutiny (Habermas 1996, 
Gutmann & Thompson 1998). Finally, the intrinsic/epistemic distinction refers to 
whether democracy is justified on moral grounds with reference to the intrinsic value of 
political equality (for a clear-cut justification of this sort, see Urbinati 2014), or whether 
democracy is regarded as legitimate as far as its procedures have “truth-tracking” or 
“truth-sensitive” qualities that contributes to improving on decisions (List and Goodin 
2001, Christiano 2012).    
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These distinctions are selected because they are of uncontroversial significance 
for a discussion of democratic merits under conditions of reasonable disagreement, and 
because they delineate separable dimensions in assessments of democratic legitimacy. 
We will refer to them as the inclusion dimension, the mechanism of decision-making 
dimension, and the justification dimension. To be sure, not all democratic theory positions 
are covered by these dimensions as we define them.3 The dimensions can certainly also 
overlap and some combinations are more common than others. They do however have 
relative conceptual independence, in that each of them adds distinctive normative 
concerns. Just as elite democrats, participatory democrats can be variably concerned 
with the deliberative qualities of procedures; deliberative and aggregative democrats 
can care more or less about participatory levels; and aggregation or deliberation, broad 
or narrow participation, can be defended with reference to one or the other reasonable 
interpretation of norms of democratic equality, and/or as conductive for the quality of 
decisions and policies. Finally, participatory/elite, aggregative/deliberative and 
intrinsic/epistemic are not mutually exclusive and can in practice be combined, for 
example when someone cherishes participation in some parts of the policy-cycle while 
allowing for elite governance in others, or defends the centrality of free and fair 
elections in combination with deliberative advisory bodies, or supports universal voting 
rights with reference to the norm of political equality while also putting considerable 
weight on policy and decision quality. In the discussion that follows we focus however 
on the relatively pure versions of the opposing democracy conceptions that define our 
three selected dimensions, to get a broader picture of what our findings imply for 
democratic legitimacy under conditions of reasonable disagreement. 
 
                                                          
3 For example have other instrumental benefits of democracy been brought forward, such as more 




We examine the changing role of academic knowledge within Norwegian ad hoc 
advisory commissions both empirically and normatively. The analysis is based on a 
dataset of all ad hoc commissions in the field of economic policy appointed during the 
period 1967-2013 that published an Official Norwegian Report and that had a policy-
preparing function (see appendix for details). This comprises 80 commissions with a 
total of 779 members, 311 secretaries and 3936 citations.  
Our rationale for focusing on economic policy is substantive: Governing the 
economy has become a key concern for policy-makers all over the world given the 
impact of economic policy on outcomes such as growth, stability and equality. Economic 
policy also influences the scope for other types of policy, for instance by determining 
government spending (budget policy) and revenue levels (taxation policy). Certainly, 
one can question how representative economic policy is for other areas of public policy. 
Economic policy can be seen as especially amenable to scientific knowledge since it is 
based on a set of complex relationships that are difficult to grasp for outsiders. 
Professional economic expertise and advice have enjoyed a special place in government 
policy-making in the postwar period (Fourcade 2006). One response to this, however, is 
that we examine changes over time within the economic policy area, meaning that we 
control for stable features of the policy field. Moreover, a number of other policy areas 
are also highly technical and amenable to academic knowledge, such as health, 
environment or transport policy. Finally, economic policy is an area where we may also 
expect a high degree of bureaucratic control and political involvement. In Norway, 
economic policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, which is widely 
regarded as the most powerful ministry (e.g. Lie & Venneslan 2010). Many economic 
policy issues also have high political salience, which may lead us to expect politicians to 
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be interested in controlling inquiries in the field. As such, economic policy provides a 
suitable context for examining the tension between the reliance on academic knowledge 
and other concerns in public policy-making. 
Empirically, we trace the changing role of academic knowledge within 
commissions along two dimensions. The first is the participation of academics on 
commissions. This is measured as the share of commission chairmen, members and 
secretaries drawn from universities and research institutes, and the share of 
commissions where academics are represented. The participation of academics captures 
to what extent commissions include people with advanced academic knowledge rather 
than actors with other types of knowledge or interests, such as civil servants, politicians 
or interest group representatives. To be sure, there is no perfect relationship between 
the participation of academics and the actual use of academic knowledge: Academics 
may be appointed to commissions not because of their scientific knowledge but due to 
their political affiliation or position on an issue. And other actors, such as civil servants 
or politicians, may also possess advanced academic knowledge. Yet, on the whole, we 
expect that the involvement of academics in commission deliberations is conducive to a 
greater emphasis on academic knowledge in defining policy problems and solutions.  
The second dimension is the use of citations in commission reports. The use of 
citations to academic literature is an indication of the extent to which the arguments 
made by a commission are based on academic knowledge, and the kind of academic 
knowledge they are based on. Certainly, we cannot expect citations to perfectly mirror 
the ideas and knowledge underlying a report. Not every premise or argument that goes 
into a report will be accompanied by an explicit reference. And citing a source does not 
necessarily imply support for the argument in the source, or even that the piece of 
knowledge cited actually has been taken into account. Yet, it is reasonable to assume 
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that citations to some extent reflect the content of the report: A report that makes 
extensive reference to academic publications will very likely be more profoundly rooted 
in academic knowledge than a report with few such references. Moreover, the use of 
citations in general indicates to what extent reports make explicit reference to sources, 
something that may be identified with an academic style of argumentation. In the 
citation analysis, we therefore examine the total volume of citations in commission 
reports and the volume and share of citations to academic knowledge. 
There are also other potential indicators of the role of academic knowledge in 
commission work, such as measures of the scientific quality of reports (see e.g. Innvær 
2009) or the extent to which internal commission discussions are dominated by 
academic arguments (Tellmann 2016). However, we have chosen to examine 
participation and citations given that these measures get at core aspects of the 
underlying theoretical concept and allow for systematic comparison across a large 
number of commissions and over time.  
Finally, the normative analysis consists of evaluating the developments in the 
reliance on academic knowledge – the participation of academics and the use of citations 
– in light of different conceptions of democratic legitimacy, and more specifically along 
the dimensions of inclusion, decision-making mechanism and justification.   
 
The Changing Role of Academic Knowledge in Norwegian Advisory Commissions 
Whereas the total number of advisory commissions in Norway dropped markedly from 
the 1970s to the 2000s, the number of policy-preparing commissions in the economic 
field remained stable over time. Table 1 shows the number of ad hoc commissions 
charged with examining economic policy that were appointed in the periods 1967-79, 
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1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-13, respectively, as well as the total number of commission 
members, secretariat members and citations in commission reports in each of these 
periods. As we see, about 20 commissions were appointed in each period. The number of 
commission members was also relatively stable over time, whereas the number of 
secretariat members increased. The number of citations in commission report also 
increased markedly over time, as will be discussed later. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]     
 
Composition of Commissions 
How did the participation of academics on these commissions change over time? We 
first look at the affiliation of commission members. Figure 1 shows the percentage of all 
commission members that came from academia, the civil service, interest groups, and 
political parties, respectively, during different periods. (Members from the Norwegian 
statistics bureau are coded as a separate category, given that they are part of the civil 
service but are scientifically independent.) The categories are mutually exclusive. See 
the appendix for details on coding. 
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The figure shows a marked increase in the proportion of commission members who 
came from universities and research institutes, from less than one out of ten members 
before 1980 to more than a quarter of members after 2000. By contrast, civil servants, 
who made up almost half of all commission members before 1990, accounted for less 
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than 30 percent of members after 2000. The share of commission members from 
interest groups fluctuated over time but increased to 23 percent in the period after 
2000. Also noteworthy is the declining participation of politicians: while political party 
representatives made up 10 percent of commission members in the 1970s, this share 
dropped to four percent in the most recent period. One can of course question whether 
it makes sense to draw a stark distinction between academics and civil servants in a 
context where many civil servants hold degrees in economics. Yet, there are some 
compelling reasons for distinguishing between the two. First, civil servants are formally 
loyal to their political leadership, meaning that they can be instructed by the minister to 
take a certain stance within the commission, whereas academics are formally 
independent. Second, academics can be expected to have deeper and more updated 
scientific knowledge. As such, the two groups bring different competences and points of 
view to policy formulation. 
 The growing presence of academics is also evident if we look at another measure, 
namely the share of commissions where academics were represented. Figure 2 shows 
the percentage of commissions that included at least one member from a specific 
category (academia, the civil service, interest groups, political parties, Statistics Bureau) 
during different time periods. Note that the percentages in this figure refer to the share 
of commissions, not the share of commission members. For instance, the value ‘95 %’ for 
academia in the period 2000-13 means that 95 percent of the commissions appointed in 
this period included at least one academic. The percentages do not add up to 100 
percent since several categories can be represented within the same commission.     
 




The figure shows that whereas academics were present on a little more than half of all 
commissions before 1990, they were represented on nearly every commission after 
1990. We also see that civil servants were present on virtually every commission 
throughout the period. In other words, both civil servants and academics were 
guaranteed a place at the commission table in the period after 1990. This was not the 
case for interest groups, which were only represented on about half of the commissions 
appointed after 1990 – even though this share increased from the 1990s to the 2000s. 
Also noteworthy is the increasing presence of another category of experts, namely 
researchers from the Norwegian statistics bureau, which were represented on 70 
percent of the commissions appointed after 1990. The figure also shows that political 
representation on commissions became increasingly rare: Politicians were represented 
on only one economic policy commission after 2000. 
 Beyond the overall composition of commissions, there have been major changes 
in who chairs these commissions. The chairman occupies an important role on 
Norwegian commissions. Not only does the chairman organize and set the direction for 
the work of the commission and its secretariat. He or she also represents the 
commission vis-à-vis the government and the public. Table 2 shows the affiliation of 
commission chairmen in different periods. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As we can see, academics have to a large extent replaced civil servants as chairmen of 
economic commissions. In the 1990s and 2000s, more than half of commission chairmen 
were drawn from universities and research institutes, as compared to only a few in the 
1970s. In addition, a number of chairmen in the most recent period were drawn from 
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the statistics bureau. By contrast, the number of chairmen from the civil service 
dwindled over time. 
 Given the growing participation of academics as commission chairmen and 
members, do we see the same trend in commission secretariats? The secretariat often 
carries out a substantial part of the work of the commission, including the collection of 
data and the drafting of reports. The size of commission secretariats has increased over 
time, from about one secretary per commission in the 1970s to more than six secretaries 
per commission after 2000. Table 3 shows the composition of commission secretariats 
over time. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Interestingly, there was no increase in the participation of academics in commission 
secretariats. During a period of more than 40 years, academics accounted for only a 
handful of secretaries. Secretariats were instead completely dominated by civil servants 
throughout the period. The lion’s share of these officials came from the Ministry of 
Finance, which accounted for nearly two thirds of the secretaries in commissions set up 
after 2000. 
 
Citations in Commission Reports 
Another expression of the role of academic knowledge on commissions is the use of 
citations in commission reports. Figure 3 shows the development over time in the 





[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
First of all, we see that the total volume of citations in commission reports increased 
exponentially over time, from about 15 citations per 100 pages in the 1970s and 80s to 
nearly 60 citations per 100 pages in the period after 2000. In other words, commissions 
increasingly embraced the explicit citing of sources, which can be identified as an 
academic practice. Moreover, international academic research accounted for the largest 
volume of citations. Commissions appointed after 2000 on average cited international 
academic research 20 times per 100 pages, up from 4 citations per 100 pages in the 
1970s. The majority of these references were to articles in international scientific 
journals, primarily in the economics field. National policy documents – such as previous 
commission reports, legislative proposals and white papers – were cited 12 times per 
100 pages in the post-2000 period, up from 3 times per 100 pages in the 1970s. Other 
important sources of citations were international policy documents and policy research 
(i.e. publications by international organizations and foreign governments) and national 
academic and policy research. By contrast, there was only a small number of citations to 
documents produced by interest groups, think tanks and consultancy firms. 
 Further analysis provides additional evidence of altered citation practices within 
commissions. While reports with no or very few citations to existing knowledge were 
common in the 1970s and 80s, reports from the last 10 years all contained a sizeable 
number of citations (see figure 4). There was, moreover, a marked increase in the 
maximum volume of citations in reports, as the five reports with the greatest number of 
citations all were published after 2000. 
  




Did these developments imply that academic knowledge crowded out other types of 
knowledge in commission reports? To get at this, table 4 shows the distribution of 
citations across different sources. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Although the proportion of citations to international academic research increased over 
time, the increase was not dramatic. The proportion of citations to national academic 
research dropped somewhat over the same period. The share of citations to national 
policy documents, by contrast, remained stable over time, belying any strong arguments 
about a shift towards academic knowledge. As for more policy-oriented research, the 
share of citations to national policy research decreased over time, whereas the 
percentage of references to international policy research increased somewhat. The 
share of citations to documents produced by interest groups, think-tanks, etc. remained 
small throughout the period. If anything, the figure suggests a moderate shift from 
national to international sources of knowledge, as international sources came to account 
for a majority of citations in commission reports after 2000.  
 Overall, our analysis indicates a growing reliance on academic knowledge within 
Norwegian advisory commissions in the economic domain. The increasing number of 
academics appointed as commission chairmen and members, and the presence of 
academics on nearly every commission in recent decades, point towards a growing 
participation of academics in the definition of policy problems and solutions within 
commissions. Moreover, the growth in the total volume of citations in commission 
reports and in the number of citations to international academic literature suggests both 
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a more academic style and an increasing reliance on scientific knowledge in commission 
work. At the same time, statist elements remained important. The bureaucracy’s 
presence on virtually every commission and near-monopoly on secretariat posts 
suggests a continued scope for bureaucratic influence over commission work, on top of 
the state’s ability to steer the commission through the appointment decision and the 
formulation of the terms of reference. The fact that national policy documents remained 
an important source of policy arguments and principles also suggests that political-
administrative concerns remained important in commission deliberations. As for the 
corporatist character of commissions, interest groups maintained a substantial 
presence. Yet, their place at the commission table was not guaranteed in the same way 
as that of civil servants and academics. The dearth of citations to interest group 
publications may also suggest that interest groups had limited importance as providers 
of knowledge and evidence in commission discussions. As such, the position of 




These findings, moreover, have implications for democratic legitimacy that vary along 
our three selected dimensions. For participatory democrats who cherish broad inclusion 
and active lay participation at all stages of the policy-cycle, an increase in academic 
commission members relative to politicians and interest group representatives 
constitutes a clear legitimacy problem. From their perspective, the commission system 
would already be challenged democratically speaking, even without this increase, as 
advisory commissions consist of a restricted set of members and so allow for limited 
participation. More academics, civil servants’ control of the secretariats, politicians’ near 
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disappearance and the vulnerability of interest group participation only add to an 
already troublesome situation. Furthermore, the increased use of academic citations and 
of academic referencing practices suggests that academics are also to a larger extent 
setting the agenda for commission negotiations and deliberations. This confirms 
participatory democrats’ fear that limited and decreasing lay participation will also 
result in reduced lay influence on framing and arguments. To be sure, to the extent that 
academics operate as participatory researchers and regard their commission 
membership as part of a broader advocacy engagement, even participatory democrats 
would assess scientization processes more mildly. Yet, for participatory democrats, lay 
advocacy cannot replace lay presence and participation. And importantly in our case, 
there is little evidence that economic researchers and professors engaged in economic 
policy and other commissions conceive of their role in these terms (Tellmann 2016). 
Elite democrats, on the other hand, will prima facie have fewer worries. For them it is 
not necessarily a problem for legitimacy that elites and elite knowledge 
disproportionally influence policy-making. Rather, this will typically be regarded as 
precondition for better – more stable, more effective, more rational etc. – democratic 
governance. Accordingly, confronted with our findings, elite democrats would have 
different concerns. A key question for them, obviously, would be what it means for the 
viability and quality of governance that the composition and premises of commission 
elites have become significantly more ‘academic’, and whether a differently premised 
policy preparation arrangement, relying more substantively on the participation and 
knowledge of other elites (corporate, parliamentarian, bureaucratic, etc.), would be 
better.     
 As for the decision-making mechanism dimension, aggregative democrats would 
be skeptical of any political arrangement, advisory commissions included, that give 
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some revealed preferences – those represented around the commission table – more 
consideration than others, and that compete with vote aggregation in purer versions, for 
example as this takes place during national elections. Our findings would however most 
likely increase aggregative democrats’ worries as the larger role of academics and the 
persistent control of civil servants of the secretariats in combination with less influence 
from politicians and increased interest group precariousness, would tend to reduce 
preference representativeness, since academics and bureaucrats typically lack a 
constituency that would hold them to account. For deliberative democrats, to the 
contrary, the identified developments would hold some promise. Not only could we 
expect academics as such to be relatively deliberatively tuned due to their professional 
role and ethos. The increased manifest use of academic and other references in 
commission reports could also indicate a firmer orientation towards reason-giving in 
advisory commissions. Importantly, the growth in references facilitates further scrutiny 
and critical interrogation as assumptions and arguments are made more explicit and 
transparent.   
 Finally, to the extent that our findings indicate a growth in political privileges for 
academics and a situation increasingly characterized by citizens and groups having 
unequal political standing, they are prima facie problematic from a justificatory 
perspective that considers democratic norms of political equality as intrinsically 
valuable. From an epistemic perspective, the greater role of academic knowledge and 
the continued bureaucratic control over advisory commissions must be given a different 
initial assessment. That is, the changes in composition and references must be evaluated 
on the basis of their epistemic merits, and it is not evident that the ascent of academics 
relative to politicians and interest groups in advisory commissions would result in 
reports and recommendations that are less “truth-sensitive”. To the contrary, it would 
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seem that the observed developments are good for policy outcomes, as far as academics, 
supplemented by civil servants, have a deliberative orientation and bring relevant 
information and analyses to the table and so contribute to policy preparation processes 
that are more consistently grounded in reasonable argument and scientific research. 
 
Conclusion 
Ad hoc advisory commissions play a vital role in the preparation of public policy in the 
Nordic countries. In this article, we have presented new evidence that indicates a 
growing reliance on academic knowledge within this kind of commissions. Through an 
analysis of Norwegian commissions in economic policy, we have shown that both the 
participation of academics on commissions and the use of citations in general – and to 
international academic literature in particular – increased markedly from the 1970s to 
the 2000s. These findings challenge the dominant corporatist and statist accounts of 
Nordic commissions. Whereas work in the corporatist vein has pointed to a scaling back 
of the institutionalized participation of interest groups in policy-making and a 
concomitant decline of the commission system, this study indicates that the commission 
institution also has undergone a transformation through which academic actors have 
taken an increasingly prominent place. And although the control of the state over 
commissions remains significant, this study suggests that government has increasingly 
needed to lean on outside expertise to ensure the legitimacy of commissions. This 
constitutes a novel development in the evolution of Nordic commissions, with significant 
implications for empirical analysis and for the normative evaluation of the commission 
institution. For participatory democrats our findings indicate less inclusion, and so less 
democracy. Aggregative democrats will be critical of how greater academic participation 
reduces preference representativeness. If political equality is the ultimate standard, 
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more political power to academics and bureaucrats is prima facie worrisome, and in 
need of justification. Yet, given a broader scope of what democracy means and implies, 
developments come out in a different light. For elite democrats the rise of commission 
elites as such is perfectly legitimate and even recommendable; the decisive question is 
whether more academics make policy-making elites better. As for deliberative and 
epistemic democrats, we could expect them to welcome this trend, inasmuch as 
academics stick to their prescribed role of bringing validated knowledge to the table and 
the increased use of references indicates a more deliberative commission culture. 
To be sure, there are some important limits to our analysis. First, our quantitative 
data on commission participation and citations only provides a partial picture of the use 
of academic knowledge within commissions. For instance, it says little about the reasons 
for appointing academics or about the character of internal commission deliberations. 
Yet, recent work based on qualitative interviews with commission members has pointed 
to the importance of academic expertise and arguments in commission discussions 
(Tellmann 2016), which increases our confidence that our findings are not a result of the 
methods and measures used. In any case, the development hinted at here needs to be 
substantiated by more in-depth qualitative and historical analyses. Second, we have only 
analyzed commissions within economic policy. The extent to which commissions have 
come to rely on academic knowledge may vary across policy areas, due to differences in 
how technical the policy area is, which academic disciplines are dominant and which 
bureaucratic and societal actors are active in the field. Examining this potential variation 
is a task for future research. A third limitation is that official advisory commissions only 
make up one part of the Norwegian ‘policy advisory system’, which also includes other 
types of working groups, advice-giving by civil servants and political appointees, the use 
of consultancy firms, etc. We can therefore not say whether the growing reliance on 
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academic experts within these commissions has been countered (or reinforced) by other 
trends, such as an increasing use of external consultants in the public sector. However, 
considering the government’s consistent use of official advisory commissions to look 
into the most important matters of public policy, the expanding role of academics on 
these commissions must be seen as a significant development within the Norwegian 
policy advice regime. Fourth, we have shied away from the issue of whether the growing 
reliance on academic knowledge should be seen as an expression of instrumental or 
symbolic knowledge utilization (see Hunter and Boswell 2015), largely because it is 
difficult to assess this empirically based on our quantitative data. One could interpret 
the steep rise in the number of academics appointed to the highly visible position of 
commission chairman, compared to the persistent absence of academics in less visible 
secretariat posts, as a sign that the participation of academics on commission had 
certain symbolic aspects. But additional evidence is needed to draw firmer conclusions 
to this effect. 
Finally, a fuller assessment of the democratic legitimacy of Norwegian 
commissions will need to take more features of the commissions and reports into 
account. More investigations are needed to establish the precise relationship between 
the increased role of academic experts and knowledge, preference representativeness 
and participatory patterns (cf. aggregative and participatory democracy), the extent to 
which academics actually live up to their prescribed role and ethos and avoid being 
subsumed to biases and interests (cf. deliberative and epistemic democracy), and the 
impact of more academic commissions on policy-making effectiveness (cf. elite 
democracy). The wider political system must also be considered, given that 
shortcomings in one part of the system may be compensated for in other parts 
(Parkinson & Mansbridge 2012). Civil society can have a say about commission reports 
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through hearing and consultation procedures (improving participatory credentials), 
ministries can put low-quality reports aside (improving epistemic merits), etc. But it can 
of course also be the other way around: not much is gained participation-wise if 
stakeholder consultation has no effect on outcomes, and epistemic performance is 
unlikely to be improved if the least deliberative reports turn out to be the most 
cherished by decision-makers for strategic or symbolic reasons. 
 The present study nevertheless has some interesting broader implications. For 
one thing, it contributes to giving a firmer empirical grounding to diagnoses of 
contemporary governance as increasingly ‘scientized’ and ‘epistocratic’, although within 
the parameters of administrative control. A couple of lessons for normative analysis can 
also be drawn. First, normative diagnoses are often accused of lacking sufficient 
empirical basis, while empirical analyses unreflective of normative issues can be 
suspected to smuggle in ‘silent’ value hierarchies and assessments. Our study 
exemplifies how empirical and normative analyses can be combined, adding both 
stronger significance and clearer purpose to the empirical study and a more precise 
factual grounding of the normative assessments. Secondly, under pluralist conditions, 
normative parameters are reasonably contested. Our normative analysis takes this 
complexity into account, and delivers assessments that are non-trivial and systematic, 
depending on conception of democratic legitimacy, while avoiding the dogmatic flavor 
that inevitably haunt normative analyses that decide for this or that goal interpretation 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics   
Period 1967-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-13 Total 
Number of commissions 16 21 23 20 80 
Number of commission members 158 232 196 193 779 
Number of secretariat members 19 52 119 121 311 





Figure 1: Affiliation of commission members. Percent of all commission members. 
 
Note: ‘Commission members’ include commission chairmen but exclude members of the commission 











































Figure 2: Share of commissions with at least one member from a specific category (civil service, 












































1967-79 7 3 0 3 2 1 16 
1980-89 10 7 0 1 1 2 21 
1990-99 6 12 0 0 3 2 23 







Table 3: Affiliation of secretariat members. Percent of secretariat members. 







1967-79 89 % (47 %) 0 % 11 % 0 % 19 
1980-89 98 % (79 %) 2 % 0 % 0 % 52 
1990-99 94 % (54 %) 3 % 0 % 3 % 119 
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Table 4: Distribution of citations in commission reports by source. Percent. 




















1967-79 20 % 15 % 19 % 9 % 2 % 31 % 2 % 3 % 250 
1980-89 29 % 23 % 18 % 9 % 4 % 13 % 2 % 3 % 512 
1990-99 19 % 13 % 19 % 9 % 3 % 31 % 3 % 2 % 1145 
2000-13 21 % 10 % 10 % 13 % 7 % 35 % 3 % 1 % 2029 






Appendix: Data and Coding  
The analysis is based on pdf versions of Official Norwegian Reports (Norges Offentlige 
Utredninger – NOU) collected from the websites of the National Library of Norway 
(www.nb.no) and the Norwegian government (www.regjeringen.no). The analysis 
includes all ad hoc commissions appointed during the period 1967-2013 that published 
an Official Norwegian Report, that submitted their report to the Ministry of Finance, and 
that had a policy-preparing function. Having a policy-preparing function means that the 
commission was charged with examining policy questions. This excludes commissions 
whose primary task was to draft legal texts (lovutvalg). The rationale for leaving out 
law-drafting commissions is our interest in the role of experts in shaping the substance 
of policy. While law-drafting commissions may shape the legal framework in an area, 
they have little influence on the choice of overarching policy goals and means. We also 
exclude five commissions that had nothing to do with economic policy or for which data 
are missing. In the analysis, the unit of observation is the commission report. 
Commissions that produced multiple reports are thus counted multiple times. This 
concerns four commissions, which produced a total of 13 reports. All these reports are 
included since they often concerned separate issues and were written by a slightly 
different group of members. 
 NOU reports are official documents and are recognized as a legal source in 
Norwegian jurisprudence. Reports normally include information on the composition and 
work of the commission, its considerations and proposals, and references to relevant 
documents and literature. The composition of the commissions is coded as follows: 
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(1) Members: The analysis includes members of the commission at the time of 
appointment plus members who joined the commission later and did not 
replace existing members. 
(2) Affiliation: The affiliation of members, chairmen and secretaries is coded 
primarily based on the organization or job title given in the reports, which 
indicates in which capacity the members participate in the commission. 
‘Academia’ includes anyone working in a scientific position at a university, 
university college or research institute. ‘Civil service’ refers administrators in 
public organizations at all levels. ‘Political parties’ includes anyone who at the 
time of appointment was a minister, under-secretary of state (statssekretær), 
member of parliament (MP) or deputy MP, or mayor. Where information in 
the report is insufficient, other sources are used to establish affiliation. 
 
The citation analysis includes all references that are listed either in a 
bibliography or footnotes in the commission reports. Multiple citations to the same 
document in one report are excluded. Citations are coded according to the following 
scheme: 
  
Table A1: Coding scheme for citation analysis 
 Policy documents Policy research Academic research 
National NOU reports, government 
bills and acts, laws, etc. 
Research from national 
government bodies, 
studies commissioned for 
government reports* 
Research from Norwegian 
academic journals, books, 
etc. 




Research from foreign 





journals, books, etc. 
* Publications from interest groups, think tanks and consultancy firms are coded as a separate category. 
 
